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Abstract: The paper examines three related questions. How is the crisis affecting the governance of the 
IMF and the influence that developing countries have within the institution; the policy space available to 
developing countries; and the prospects that alternative financial architectures will emerge as competitors 
or complements to the Fund? At this point it appears that IMF practice on capital controls has changed 
partly as a consequence of the crisis, that relatively autonomous developing countries are taking 
advantage of the policy space that has emerged, and that the global financial architecture is becoming 
more heterogeneous and multi-nodal. Developing countries do not yet enjoy more formal influence at 
the IMF as a consequence of the crisis. However, it is premature to conclude now that the formal and 
informal influence of developing countries will not increase in the coming years. 
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  11. INTRODUCTION 
 
Has the current crisis altered the economic development landscape, as many have hoped? In part, this 
depends on the effects of the crisis on various dimensions of global financial governance vis-à-vis 
developing economies. Even before the crisis signs were emerging of changes in the institutions and 
processes that bear on global financial flows and other financial determinants of developmental policy 
space. The question to be addressed here is whether these changes have by now borne fruit? Has the 
crisis induced new beginnings in financial governance, or have the initiatives undertaken proven to be 
chimerical? 
The heart of this paper examines three related questions. How is the crisis affecting the governance of 
the IMF and the influence that developing countries have within the institution; the policy space 
available to developing countries; and the prospects that alternative financial architectures will emerge as 
competitors or important complements to the Fund? I am particularly interested in highlighting those 
instances where we find some evidence of increasing policy space or alternative institutional 
arrangements as a consequence of failing institutions, changes in ideas, changes in the geography of 
influence in the global economy, or ambiguity that has emerged in the crisis environment.  
 
It is too early, of course, to draw definitive conclusions about just how financial governance vis-à-vis 
developing countries will in fact evolve as a consequence of the crisis. But it is an appropriate moment to 
examine the promising avenues, false starts and dead ends that have already emerged. At this point it 
appears that IMF practice on capital controls has changed partly as a consequence of the crisis, that 
relatively autonomous developing countries are taking advantage of the policy space that has emerged, 
and that the global financial architecture is becoming more heterogeneous and multi-nodal. Developing 
countries do not yet enjoy more formal influence at the IMF as a consequence of the crisis, though it 
may be that their voting power will increase very modestly in 2012. It is simply too early to tell whether 
other changes at the IMF (particularly the emergence of developing countries as lenders to the 
institution) will ultimately reconfigure channels of informal influence at the institution.  
 
2. IMF GOVERNANCE 
 
The IMF has had a dominant and controversial role in financial governance from the debt crisis of the 
1980s through the immediate aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Many Fund 
observers have hoped that the current financial crisis would create space for governance reforms at the 
institution. Governance changes at the Fund could involve changes of two sorts, formal and informal. 
On the formal level, there is the possibility of an alteration in the formal rules that condition voting 
rights and formal decision making at the institution. There is also the possibility of informal changes that 
bear on the relative influence of individual members over decisions and practices at the institution. 
 
The IMF emerged from the Asian crisis a greatly weakened institution in regards to its credibility around 
the world, the adequacy of its own financial resources, the size of its staff, and the geographic reach of its 
programs. Critics on both the left and the right railed against the institutions’ mission creep, heavy 
handedness, domination by the US government and by private financial interests, its myriad failures in 
East Asia prior to and following the crisis, and its excessively harsh and intrusive conditionality.  
 
  2An important consequence of the Asian crisis and subsequent changes in the global economy was the 
loss of purpose, standing and relevance of the IMF. Indeed, prior to the current global financial crisis, 
demand for the institution’s resources was at an historic low. Major borrowers (including Argentina, 
Brazil, and Ukraine) had repaid their outstanding debt to the institution and the Fund had contracted its 
staff by as much as 15% [Kapur and Webb, 2006; Thomas, 2009].1 In fiscal year 2005, just six countries 
had Stand-by Arrangements (hereafter, SBAs)2 with the Fund, the lowest number since 1975 [Kapur and 
Webb, 2006]. From 2003 to 2007, the Fund’s loan portfolio shrunk dramatically: from $105 billion to 
less than $10 billion, while just two countries, Turkey and Pakistan, owed most of the $10 billion 
[Weisbrot, Cordero and Sandoval, 2009]. The IMF’s list of customers came to include primarily only 
extremely poor countries that had no choice but to seek its assistance [Chorev and Babb, 2009].  
 
The current crisis has been good to the IMF [Chorev and Babb, 2009]. It has rescued the institution 
from its growing irrelevance by re-establishing its central role as first responder to financial distress for 
many countries. This re-empowerment has come about for a number of reasons. Even with reduced 
staffing, the Fund holds a monopoly position when it comes to experience in responding to financial 
distress in poorer countries.3 However, this may be starting to change. The regional and bilateral 
arrangements and institutions that have evolved in the developing world in response to the Asian crisis 
are beginning to substitute or complement the Fund in important ways (see section 4 below). Moreover, 
Fund staff may be acting on the presumption that this trend will accelerate in the future. For this reason, 
the IMF may be conducting itself somewhat differently at the current juncture simply as a way of 
maintaining its market share relative to its actual and perceived competitors (see below and fn4).  
 
The G-20 has also contributed to the IMF’s resurrection. The April 2009 meeting of the G-20 gave the 
IMF pride of place in global efforts to respond to the crisis. The meeting not only restored the IMF’s 
mandate but also yielded massive new funding commitments to the institution to support its efforts 
(even if upon close examination these commitments are less than advertised, as Chowla [2009] 
demonstrates). Representatives committed $1.1 trillion in funds to combat the financial crisis, with the 
bulk of it, namely, $750 billion to be delivered through the IMF. The Fund continues to seek additional 
resources: indeed, as of July 2010, it was soliciting an additional $250 billion, a matter to be taken up at 
the November 2010 G-20 leaders’ summit in South Korea. It also bears noting that the global crisis has 
reinvigorated not only the IMF, but also other multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
EBRD.4  
                                     
1 Ukraine returned to borrower status in July 2010.  
2 SBAs are the IMF’s basic short-term loan agreement. 
3 Events in and on the periphery of the European Union (EU) have contributed substantially to the IMF’s resurrection because the 
EU, European Commission and European Central Bank need the Fund’s expertise, financial assistance and authority. Indeed, Lütz 
and Kranke (2010] argue that the EU has “rescued” the IMF by partnering with it on bailouts in Europe and by channeling its harsh 
conditionality circa the 1980s and 1990s. 
4 For an interesting anecdote along these lines, see McElhiny [2009] for a description of how the Inter-American Development Bank’s 
holiday party in 2008 celebrated the increased demand for infrastructure stimulus packages through a musical number performed by 
some Bank staff. See Kulish [2009] on the reinvigoration of the EBRD. 
There is some evidence that the Fund is beginning to face competition from other institutions. For instance, Wade [2010:fn10) points 
out that the IMF is losing new business to the World Bank outside of the European rescues. And he notes that even in Europe, 
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New pathways of informal influence at the Fund 
 
At the April 2009 G-20 meeting several developing countries committed to purchase the IMF’s first 
issuance of its own bonds: China committed to purchase $50 billion while Brazil, Russia, South Korea 
and India each committed to purchase $10 billion. Thus, $90 billion of the $500 billion in new resources 
for IMF lending will come from countries that have traditionally not played an important role in Fund 
governance. The support for the Fund coming from developing countries is surely a landmark event at 
the institution. For our purposes what is most important about these new commitments is that they not 
only contribute to the Fund’s resurrection, but they also reflect the global power and autonomy of these 
rapidly growing economies (see section 3 below). These changes in financial flows between member 
nations and the IMF may ultimately bear on the ability of these and other developing countries to exert 
influence at the institution in ways that change its informal and even its formal practices.  
 
Adding to the potential that these new lenders may influence informal decision making at the Fund over 
time is the fact that the Chinese government is now behaving in a more “muscular” fashion on the 
global stage. This muscularity is reflected in many ways—for example, in the strong position it has taken 
in the face of US government claims that it is manipulating its currency, and thereby contributing to 
global imbalances. The appointment in February 2010 of Zhu Min, Deputy Governor of the Peoples 
Bank of China, as Special Advisor to the IMF’s Managing Director provides another channel by which 
China (and perhaps other developing countries) may be able to influence informal decision making at the 
IMF in time. 
 
Formal governance reform 
 
Formal IMF governance has long been a point of contention among developing countries and civil 
society organizations. To date, progress on even modest governance reform at the Fund has been glacial. 
After nearly 12 years of pressure, the “Singapore reforms” of 2006 have resulted in inconsequential 
changes in the formal voice and vote of developing countries at the Fund. As a consequence of these 
reforms, the voting shares held by the US fell from 17% to 16.7%, by high-income countries from 52.7% 
to 52.3%, the voting shares of the BRIC countries plus Mexico increased from 10.1% to 11.1%, those 
held by China increased from 2.9% to 3.6%, and the voting shares held by the “rest of the world” (that 
is, 163 of 185 countries) dropped 0.5 percentage points from 37.1% to 36.6% [Weisbrot and Johnson, 
2009].  
 
The funding commitments made by developing countries to the IMF in April 2009 were not conditioned 
on specific governance reforms, though the matter was raised quite clearly by the institution’s new 
funders, particularly Brazil and China. Indeed, senior Chinese officials said at the time that Beijing would 
be willing to contribute more money if China’s quota were adjusted to reflect its economic weight, 
namely, by basing its quota on output per person [Landler, 3/30/09]. 5 The BRIC countries and the G-
                                                                                                                    
Turkey broke off negotiations with the Fund in early March 2010 because of the severity of its conditions. A few weeks later the 
country negotiated a $1.3 billion loan with the Bank.  
5 See Woods [2010] for discussion of the position articulated by Brazil’s Finance Minister. The Russian government appears a bit 
ambivalent on this matter. On many different occasions it has aligned itself with critics of IMF governance and it has certainly been 
among the most outspoken critics of the US’ “exhorbitant priviledge” [on the latter, see Johnson, 2008]. But officials have 
  424 in fall 2009 proposed a 7% increase in quotas in favor of developing countries [Reuters.com, 
9/15/09]. China proposed a far more ambitious goal for governance reform: in September 2009, cen
bank officials called for the establishment of a timeline to transfer 50% of the voting rights at the IMF




                                                                                                                   
 
The September 2009 G-20 meeting resulted, not surprisingly, in something far more modest: namely, 
representatives agreed to increase the quota share held by under-represented and developing countries by 
at least 5% at the IMF and by at least 3% at the World Bank. However, negotiations on this modest 
change stalled for a year owing to conflicts between the US and Europe and among European countries 
(as the IMF acknowledged, see IMF 2010c). In October 2010 the G-20 Finance Ministers appeared to 
regain some momentum on this issue when they agreed to transfer 6% of the voting rights at the Fund 
to developing countries by the fall of 2012. European representatives also agreed to cede two seats on 
the Executive Board. It is impossible to say at this point whether the stalemate between the US and 
Europe and among Europeans will emerge again so as to frustrate implementation of the voting reforms 
agreed to in the fall of 2010.  
 
Another aspect of governance reform that was raised in the early days of the current crisis centered on 
long-held concerns about the process by which leaders of the IMF and World Bank have been selected. 
Developing countries have long chafed at the “gentlemen’s agreement” that has meant that the Fund’s 
director is a European and the World Bank’s director an American. The G-20 finance ministers 
reportedly agreed to end this practice at their March 2009 meeting in Sussex, England [Eichengreen, 
2009a]. But discussion of this matter seems to have been sidelined at present.  
 
Though the formal dimensions of IMF governance appear resistant to change, this does not mean that 
IMF governance is set in stone. Institutional change often happens slowly and informally. It may be that 
the new loans by developing countries and the new assertiveness of some developing countries will 
ultimately be seen as part of a gradual process that results in significant changes in Fund practice. 
Governance at institutions as complex as the IMF and World Bank depends largely on informal 
practices, power and know-how (such as expertise in using back-channels to exert influence). 
Admittedly, this realm of informal governance is not likely to change overnight. This suggests that the 
effects of any reform in voting shares will be long-term rather than immediate, and successful only to the 
degree that it is associated with other changes (in personnel, ideologies, and informal practices, 
continued competition from other institutions and arrangements).  
 
3. POLICY SPACE IN RELATIVELY AUTONOMOUS STATES  
 
As we have seen, the current financial crisis has resurrected the IMF and ushered in a substantial change 
in the sources of IMF funding. But we are also seeing an equally dramatic change in the geography of 
IMF activity. In fact, even if the crisis has served to restore the IMF’s influence in certain domains, this 




occasionally stepped away from positions taken by fellow BRIC countries. E.g., during the fall 2009 meeting of the IMF-World Bank 
in Istanbul, a Russian central bank official stated that the country’s purchase of IMF bonds would not be conditioned on IMF 
governance reforms [Reuters.com, 10/5/09].  
  5As discussed above, policymakers across the developing world sought to insulate themselves from the 
hardships and humiliations suffered by Asian policymakers at the hands of the IMF. The explicit goal 
was to escape the IMF’s orbit. They did this by relying on a diverse array of strategies: self-insuring 
against future crises through the over-accumulation of reserves; the attraction of international private 
capital inflows, including new sources of finance such as securitized remittances, and the establishment 
of swap arrangements among central banks; and a new reliance on trade finance, private investment and 
official development assistance from fast-growing developing countries such as China and Brazil [Kapur 
and Webb, 2006; Ketkar and Ratha, 2008; Economist, 15 July 2010]. The dramatic decline in the IMF’s 
loan portfolio after the Asian crisis indicates the degree to which these escapist strategies proved to be 
successful. Even in the context of the current crisis, countries did their best to stay clear of IMF 
oversight. Indeed, during the current crisis, South Korea would have been a good candidate for a 
(precautionary) Flexible Credit Line with the Fund. But it did not apply for the credit line, presumably 
because of its prior experience with the Fund and to avoid the stigma of being one of its clients [Wade, 
2010:fn10]. Instead, it negotiated a reserve swap with the US Federal Reserve (see section 4 below). 
 
Those developing countries that have been able to maintain their autonomy during the crisis have used 
the resulting policy space to pursue a variety of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies and, lately, 
various types of capital controls [see Grabel, 2010). Their ability to do so indicates the degree to which 
the IMF’s geographic reach has been compromised in the years following the Asian crisis. Equally 
important for the matter at hand, the behavior of these autonomous states has served as an example for 
less powerful states which, in turn, have reacted to the crisis in ways that were taken to be unimaginable 
in previous crises. 
 
The expansion of policy space: The case of capital controls6 
 
The current crisis has achieved in a hurry something that heterodox economists have been unable to do 
for a quarter-century. It has provoked policymakers around the world to impose capital controls as a 
means to protect domestic economies from the ravaging effects of liberalized financial markets. What is 
perhaps more surprising and hopeful is that the new controls have been met variously with silence on 
the part of the IMF and the international business community and tacit acceptance of their necessity and 
prudence.  
 
This reception contrasts sharply with the IMF and investor condemnation that was provoked when 
Malaysia imposed stringent capital controls during the Asian financial crisis. At the time the IMF called 
these controls on capital outflows a “step back” (Bloomberg, 6 May 2010], and a representative article in 
the international business press stated that “foreign investors in Malaysia have been expropriated, and 
the Malaysians will bear the cost of their distrust for years” [cited in Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001:11]. More 
recently, capital controls in Thailand were reversed by the Central Bank within a few days after their 
implementation in December 2006 (following a coup) after they triggered massive capital flight 
(Bloomberg, 6 May 2010).  
 
In my view, the normalization of capital controls is the single most important way in which policy space 
for development has widened in several decades. Capital controls were the norm in developing and 
wealthy countries in the decades that followed WWII [Helleiner, 1996]. At that time, they were widely 
                                     
6 See Grabel [2010] for an in-depth examination of capital controls during the current crisis. 
  6understood by academic economists, policymakers and officials at multilateral institutions to be an 
essential tool of economic management. Policymakers deployed capital controls in order to enhance 
macroeconomic policy autonomy, promote financial and currency stability, protect domestic 
industries/sectors from foreign control or competition, and ensure the provision of adequate credit to 
favored sectors and firms at the right price [Epstein, Grabel, Jomo KS, 2004].  
 
Capital controls fell out of favor in the neo-liberal era. Indeed, up until the Asian crisis the Fund was 
poised to modify its Articles of Agreement to make the liberalization of all international private capital 
flows a central purpose of the Fund and to extend its jurisdiction to capital movements. But despite the 
neo-liberal tenor of the times, some developing countries nevertheless maintained capital controls—
most famously, Chile and Malaysia, but also China, India, Colombia, Thailand, and a few others.  
 
Then a notable development occurred. In the wake of the Asian crisis, IMF research staff started to 
change their views of capital controls—modestly and cautiously to be sure. In the post-Asian crisis 
context, the center of gravity at the Fund and in the academic wing of the economics profession shifted 
away from an unequivocal, fundamentalist opposition to any interference with the free flow of capital to 
a tentative, conditional acceptance of the macroeconomic utility of some types of capital controls. 
Permissible controls were those that were temporary, market-friendly, focused on capital inflows, and 
were introduced only when the economy’s fundamentals were mostly sound and the rest of the economy 
was liberalized [Prasad et al., 2003]. Academic literature on capital controls in the decade that followed 
the Asian crisis reflected this view: as Gallagher [2010a] points out, cross-country empirical studies 
(many of which are reviewed in Magud and Reinhart, 2006] offered strong support for the 
macroeconomic achievements of controls on inflows. Evidence supporting the achievements of outflow 
controls remains far more scant (though see Epstein et al. 2004, and on the success of outflow controls 
in Malaysia, see Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001 and Magud and Reinhart, 2006].  
 
In the midst of the current global financial crisis, this change in sentiment accelerated. Policymakers in 
many country contexts quietly began to impose a variety of capital controls, often framing them simply 
as prudential policy tools (akin to what Epstein et al. 2004 termed “capital management techniques”). 
For example, at the beginning of October 2010, South Korea added to the controls that were initially 
implemented in June 2010. Beginning on October 19, regulators will audit lenders working with foreign 
currency derivatives. The goal is to reduce the financial instability and the recent currency appreciation 
caused by the capital inflows associated with these transactions. Also in October 2010, Brazil 
strengthened twice the capital controls it first put in place in October 2009. The new Brazilian controls 
triple (from 2 to 6%) the tax it charges foreign investors on investments in fixed-income bonds. Thailand 
also deployed capital controls in October 2010: authorities introduced a 15% withholding tax on capital 
gains and interest payments on foreign holdings of government and state-owned company bonds.  
 
These controls follow on the heels of others. For example, Iceland implemented stringent controls just 
after its economy imploded in 2008, and the October 2008 SBA with the IMF made a very strong case 
for their necessity. In December 2009, Taiwan also imposed new restrictions on foreigners’ access to 
some kinds of bank deposits (and China also put some new controls in place). In June 2010 Indonesia 
announced what its officials term a “quasi capital control” that governs short-term investment in the 
country. In the same month, Argentina and Venezuela announced controls on capital outflows. 
Argentina announced stricter controls on US dollar purchases, and Venezuela imposed new controls on 
access to foreign currency. Indonesia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine also put capital controls on 
  7outflows in place to “stop the bleeding” caused by the crisis [IMF, 2009b]. Peru has been deploying a 
variety of inflow controls since early 2008. The country’s reserve requirement tax (which is a type of 
control on capital inflows) has been raised three times between June and August 2010. 
 
In contrast to the situation that faced Malaysia and Thailand in the past, we see neither condemnation 
nor penalties associated with the recent capital controls. Indeed, the ideas of economists at the Fund on 
capital controls have continued to evolve quite significantly during the crisis with the consequent effect 
of normalizing this policy instrument. By now, many reports by IMF research staff and statements by the 
institution’s highest officials has made clear that capital controls are a legitimate part of the policy toolkit, 
and that they have had positive macroeconomic accomplishments in many countries. This view has been 
reiterated on countless occasions. Indeed, IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn emphasized 
as much in a speech in Shanghai in October 2010, while in the same month the director of the Fund’s 
Western Hemispheric department made a case (unsuccessfully) for the use of controls in Colombia 
owing to the rapid appreciation of its currency. Moreover, we have seen no evidence that the capital 
controls deployed across the developing world of late have had ill effects on investor sentiment. Indeed, 
foreign investors have continued to flood these markets even after new controls are announced.7 The 
credit rating agencies, too, have not responded to controls in ways that discourage or penalize 
policymakers from using this tool.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate just why the views of IMF staff on capital controls 
have evolved so significantly. But it is likely that some combination of these factors is responsible: (1) a 
pragmatic recognition by IMF leadership and staff that the institution has no effective choice but to 
amend its policy prescriptions, owing to its diminished influence in the developing world (per the above); 
(2) relatedly, concern at the IMF about existing and future competition with other national, multilateral 
and regional financial architectures that are coming to play a greater role in the area of crisis management 
(see discussion in section 4 below); (3) the influence of leading academic economists, who themselves 
have come to question and in some respects reject the traditional neo-liberal prescription for 
development; and (4) the current global financial crisis, coming just a decade after the Asian crisis, may 
be having the effect of encouraging those economists at the IMF (and the World Bank) who have long 
had reservations about the neo-liberal model to give voice to their concerns and to assert themselves 
more effectively. It is important to keep in mind in this connection that like any complex organization, 
the IMF comprises diverse constituencies that may very well disagree among themselves about some 
fundamental matters pertaining to the institution’s strategies. 
 
The current crisis has had a powerful effect on policy space for developing countries. It has dramatically 
furthered and normalized the use of capital controls, a process that began (unevenly) after the Asian 
crisis. At the same time, policymakers in a growing number of developing countries are exploiting the 
policy space that the IMF’s diminished geography of influence is offering them.  
 
One important caveat is in order here. The argument that I advance regarding the normalization of 
capital controls at the IMF should not be read to suggest that the institution has conducted itself in an 
exemplary and entirely new fashion during the current crisis. Elsewhere I argue that in several important 
respects the Fund’s conditionality programs during the current crisis evidence strong continuity with the 
                                     
7 Certainly investor enthusiasm for developing country markets stems from the attractive returns available, especially in comparison to 
the dismal opportunities and prospects of the US, Europe and Japan at the present time. 
  8policy adjustments that the institution put in place during the Asian and the Mexican financial crises of 
the 1990s. Today, the IMF continues to apply pressure to secure compliance with stringent, pro-cyclical 
fiscal and monetary policy targets.8 Moreover, despite rhetoric by Fund staff to the contrary, expansive 
forms of conditionality (that involve e.g., privatization, market liberalization, labor market and pension 
system reform) have also returned as a key feature of recent Fund programs. Finally, the greater degree 
of fiscal flexibility granted by the Fund in some country contexts (particularly on the Eastern side of the 
European periphery) has little to no practical significance.9  
4. NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURES? THE G-20 AND REGIONAL AND BILATERAL 
INITIATIVES  
As with the Asian crisis, the current crisis has promoted interest in alternative modes of financial 
governance. Indeed, the crisis has stimulated the expansion of existing institutions and arrangements and 
the emergence of new ones. Collectively these innovations suggest that the global financial architecture is 
becoming multi-nodal and heterogenous, even if some of these arrangements ultimately prove untenable 
in the long run. It may be that innovations in IMF practice on capital controls and ultimately in its 
formal governance stem (partly) from attempts to protect the institution’s franchise from perceived or 




The formation of the G-20 in the early moments of the financial crisis initially seemed to signal the 
emergence of a new global financial architecture that was more pluralistic and inclusive than the old one, 
dominated as it was by the US, other wealthy countries, and the IMF.10 This new grouping gave 
countries such as Brazil, China, India, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa a seat at the proverbial table, along 
with the usual G-8 countries.  
 
Optimism on the significance of the G-20 was particularly high in its early days when its chief 
spokespeople seemed to be channeling the spirit of Keynes in calling for ambitious measures to counter 
the crisis and the power of the financial community. Declarations about the death of the Washington 
consensus and the need to increase the voice and vote of developing countries at the Bretton Woods 
institutions also contributed to the early promise of the G-20.  
                                     
8 A large number of recent studies of the SBAs (and other assistance programs) negotiated during the current crisis have established 
that the IMF has promoted pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy adjustments or targets [UNICEF, 2010; Van Waeyenberge, Bargawi 
and McKinley, 2010; Muchhala, 2009; Eurodad, 2009; Solidar, 2009; Weisbrot et al., 2009]. Indeed, only two studies conclude 
otherwise, and both are self-congratulatory reports by the Fund [IMF 2009a, 2009e].  
9 See Grabel [2010] for discussion of both the continuities and the discontinuities in Fund practice during the current crisis. 
10 Some observers were disappointed from the start with the organization’s lack of inclusiveness, e.g., Payne [2010] and its timidity, 
e.g., Woods [2010]. Others remained cautious, e.g., Helleiner and Pagliari [2009] and Helleiner and Porter[2009]. Helleiner and Pagliari 
[2009] argue that the first G-20 Leaders Summit in Washington DC in November 2008 might ultimately be remembered for giving G-
20, rather than G-7, leaders “a seat at the table.” However, the authors are careful to note that this legacy will only matter if the seats 
turn out to be real rather than symbolic. In a related vein, Helleiner and Porter [2009] describe the increased representation of 
developing countries on many bodies that constitute the global financial regulatory architecture (namely, the Financial Stability Board, 
the IASB, the Technical Committee of the IOSCO and the BCBS) that came about as a consequence of the November 2008 G-20 
Leaders’ Summit. However, they are also careful to note that membership in these key bodies, though expanded, still privilege larger 
over smaller developing countries. 
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However, optimism on the G-20 quickly shifted to disappointment as its Keynesian moment passed, and 
its leaders began to call for restoring fiscal balance in June 2010. However, we must recognize that it is 
premature to declare the G-20 a dead end. It is, after all, an entirely new grouping, and it may take time 
for new member countries to find ways to operate within it effectively.  
 
Significant architectural changes  
 
The experience of East Asian countries with the IMF during the Asian crisis was the catalyst for two 
developments. First, as discussed above, it led many countries (in Asia, but also elsewhere) to self-insure 
against future involvement with the Fund via the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Second, it 
stimulated a great deal of interest in the creation of regional alternatives to the Fund that could provide 
support during financial distress absent the painful and politically-difficult conditionality imposed upon 
Asian borrowers. In what follows we will see that the current crisis has been far more productive than 
the Asian crisis in terms of propelling financial innovations that may ultimately lead to a more 
decentralized, pluralistic, and heterogeneous financial architecture.  
 
Many observers have viewed both the Asian and the current crisis as an opportunity to rethink the global 
financial architecture so that regional, sub-regional and multilateral arrangements play a greater, 
complementary role in promoting financial stability and financial inclusion. For example, this view was 
articulated forcefully in the Monterrey Consensus of 2002. Writing after the Asian crisis, Mistry [1999] 
argues that regional crisis management capacity could usefully complement national and global measures. 
Writing before the current crisis and based on experiences in Europe and the Andean region, Griffith-
Jones, Griffith-Jones and Hertova [2008] conclude that there is a need for new or expanded regional and 
sub-regional development banks to fill gaps in the international financial architecture.11 In the early days 
of the current crisis, the Stiglitz Commission [UN, 2009, ch.V] called for a new global monetary system 
built from the “bottom up” through a series of agreements among regional arrangements. In a related 
vein, Ocampo [2010a] argues that improving economic and social governance necessitates the creation 
of a dense network of world, regional and national institutions in which regional and sub-regional 
institutions play a role between global and national financial arrangements [see also Ocampo 2010b, 
2006].  
 
Some observers have taken heart in early signs that the crisis is stimulating decentralization of the 
financial architecture (e.g., Helleiner, 2010; Woods, 2010; Tussie, 2010]. Chin [2010], by contrast, is less 
sanguine about the signs of emergent regionalism. He concludes that regional responses have emerged 
only modestly, especially in connection with lender of last resort assurances, financing for balance of 
payments crises, or currency stabilization. Instead, he finds that when the crisis emerged, East Asia and 
South America turned quickly to unilateral and bilateral rather than to existing regional mechanisms. 
That said, Tussie [2010] argues that we are in the middle of a period of transition to a more diverse and 
multi-tiered global financial and monetary system.  
 
                                     
11 Their preliminary calculations show that regional development banks could provide additional annual lending of approximately $77 
billion if developing countries allocated just 1% of their reserves (which at the time they wrote equaled $32 billion in reserves) to paid-
in capital for expansion of existing or the creation of regional development banks. 
  10In what follows we sketch the types of regional and bilateral initiatives that have emerged in the context 
of the crisis.  
 
Regional initiatives 
The East Asian crisis awakened interest in regional financial architectures in the developing world. That 
crisis gave voice to an aborted proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund that eventually formed the basis in 
2000 for the bilateral swap agreements that are at the heart of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). The CMI 
is a potentially important regional architecture involving ASEAN nations, China, Japan and South Korea. 
The current financial crisis has been a powerful impetus for expanding the scope of the CMI. In early 
2009 the CMI was “multilateralized,” such that it is now known as the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralisation, CMIM. The CMIM is a $120 billion regional currency reserve pool from which 
member countries can borrow during crises. China, Japan and Korea provide 80% of the CMIM’s 
resources (with China and Japan each contributing 32% to the pool or $38.4 billion). Decisions regarding 
disbursals from the fund are to be made by simple majority, and voting shares are to be allocated roughly 
in proportion to a country’s contributions. Importantly, this means that unlike the IMF’s Executive 
Board (which makes decisions by consensus), no single country can block action.12 
 
The transformation of the CMI to the CMIM is significant because it increases the scope of central bank 
currency swaps and reserve pooling arrangements in the region. This introduces the possibility that 
countries that are members of the CMIM will not need to turn to the IMF when they face liquidity crises 
in the future. It may also eliminate (at least partly) the perceived need by individual member nations to 
over-accumulate official reserves for purposes of self insurance.  
There is one critical and difficult matter that must be resolved before the CMIM can ever challenge the 
IMF in the region. That is the matter of regional surveillance and conditionality: at the behest of creditor 
countries, disbursals from the CMIM in excess of 20% of the credits available to a country require that a 
borrowing country must be under an IMF surveillance program (i.e., the IMF must review and sign-off 
on release of CMIM funds beyond this 20% threshold). The swaps available under both the CMI and the 
CMIM have yet to be activated. Indeed, during the current crisis South Korea negotiated a one-year 
swap arrangement with the US Federal Reserve in October 2008 for $30 billion rather than avail itself of 
the resources available to it under the (then) CMI.13  
 
Recent experience of the EU demonstrates that devising and implementing regional surveillance and 
conditionality is a daunting task since it involves criticizing the policies of neighbors and demanding 
substantive changes in behavior. Since political sensitivities (and rivalries) among Asian neighbors run 
even higher than in the EU, the design of a regional surveillance mechanism will likely require protracted 
negotiations (especially among China, Japan and South Korea), thereby possibly limiting the extent to 
which the CMIM will fully displace IMF governance in the region in the near future. But perhaps the 
evident costs of the EU’s failure to resolve the surveillance matter in Europe will give CMIM members 
the motivation to take up the matter seriously before the next crisis.  
 
                                     
12Description drawn from Henning [2009]. . 
13 Korea could have accessed $3.7 billion under the CMI. To have accessed the full amount available to it, namely $18.5 billion, the 
country would have had to be under an IMF agreement [Sussang Karn, 2010.]. Experience with the Fund during the Asian crisis made 
that politically infeasible. 
  11Among regions in the developing world, Latin America has long had the greatest number of regional and 
sub-regional institutions in its financial architecture. It is therefore unsurprising that the crisis has moved 
the region further in this direction. In addition, the re-emergence of more populist governments and the 
success of large commodity exporters in the region have also stimulated the growth of regional, sub-
regional and bilateral initiatives. 
 
One such initiative is the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), an institution that was founded in 1978 
as the Andean Reserve Fund to serve countries in the Andean region. It is based in Colombia, and its 
members include Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Perú, Uruguay and Venezuela. FLAR acts 
largely as a credit cooperative that lends to members’ central banks in proportion to the capital 
contributions [Chin, 2010:fn40]. FLAR has a capitalization of just over $2.3 billion. Prior to the crisis, 
FLAR lending to member countries was significant in comparison to IMF lending: indeed, from 1978 to 
2003, FLAR loans of $4.9 billion were almost 60% of the size of the loans from the IMF to the same 
countries ($8.1 billion) [Chin, 2010:fn41]. During the current crisis, FLAR made liquidity credit lines 
totaling US $1.8 billion available to member country central banks that confronted the effects of the 
current financial crisis [McElhiny, 2009]. For example, Ecuador’s central bank drew on FLAR resources 
in April 2009 by drawing on a three-year loan of $482 million. However, FLAR’s potential may be 
limited at this point by the fact that it involves a small number of countries, and the region’s largest 
economy, Brazil is not a member and has kept itself at a distance from this institution (as well as from 
the Bank of the South) [Chin, 2010].  
 
Another initiative that bears mention is the Andean Development Corporation (CAF). Most Latin 
American countries and some countries in the Caribbean are members of CAF. It is owned exclusively 
by developing countries (with the exception of Spain). CAF has assets of $4.12 billion. CAF loans have 
grown exponentially since 2000. Since 2001, CAF has been the main source of multilateral project 
financing for Andean countries (providing over 55% of multilateral financing), and since 2006, over 50% 
of its lending went to infrastructure. [Griffith-Jones, Griffith-Jones and Hertova, 2008]. CAF made a 
record number of approvals in 2009 [Tussie, 2010].  
 
Brazil and Argentina have also sought to resurrect the Agreement on Reciprocal Payments and Credits 
(CCR), an arrangement that involves bilateral lines of trade credit between the 13 central banks that are 
members of the Latin American Integration Association.14 The CCR has functioned since 1966, though 
it was not terribly significant in regional trade finance during the 1980s and 1990s. The agreement was 
given new life during the current crisis when in April 2009 its guaranteed coverage was increased from 
$120 million to $1.5 billion.  
 
Two new Latin American initiatives that bear mention are the Bank of the South (BDS) and the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). The future of these new initiatives is unknown at this 
point insofar as each is in its infancy. The BOS is an institution developed by Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez and headquartered in the country. BOS has received a great deal of attention because it 
has been situated rhetorically as a rival to the IMF. At this point, however, the rivalry remains 
aspirational rather than practical.  
 
                                     
14 Details on CCR drawn from Chin [2010]. 
  12The BDS was founded in 2007, and was officially launched in 2009 when the 4 member countries of 
MERCOSUR (namely, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and the Union of South American 
Nations (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) agreed on the details necessary to get the Bank off the 
ground.15 According to the agreement, Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela will capitalize the Bank with 
contributions of $2 billion each, Uruguay and Ecuador with $400 million each, and Bolivia and Paraguay 
with $200 million each. The Bank will grant all of its member countries the same level of voting power, 
though loans of more than $70 million will require approval of countries that represent at least 2/3 of 
the bank’s total capital (something that Brazil apparently insisted upon) [Philips, 2010]. BDS enters into 
force in 2012 when the parliaments of member countries ratify the institution’s founding agreement.  
 
Some observers view the BDS as the main component of a new regional financial architecture with 
several components, including greater cooperation in the region and increased use of its currencies 
[Vernengo 2010, citing Pedro Paez-head of the Ecuadorian Presidential Commission for the New 
Financial Architecture]. Notwithstanding visions of its future, it bears noting that by the time of its 
launch in 2009, the mandate of the BDS had been narrowed to providing “project-finance” in the region 
(i.e., providing longer-term lending for development projects in agriculture, energy, health care, 
infrastructure, and trade promotion) [Chin, 2010]. Lender of last resort emergency finance is not 
included in its existing mandate. 
 
ALBA involves eight Latin American countries. It is led by Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia, though 
Nicaragua, Dominica, Honduras, Ecuador, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and Barbados are 
members as well. This is a regional initiative designed to promote new, non-market structures, the 
creation of an integrated trade and monetary zone, and a regionally created currency, the sucre [see Hart-
Lansberg, 2010]. Several ALBA countries have already deposited agreed upon amounts of their 
currencies into a special sucre fund. Sucre exist now as a unit of account only, and are being used for 
targeted trade of specific commodities. The first sucre-denominated transaction involved Venezuelan 
rice exported to Cuba in Jan 2010; in July 2010, Ecuador and Venezuela conducted their first trade (for 
rice from Venezuela to Ecaudor) using the virtual currency (Dow Jones, 2010].  
 
Regional development banks 
Prior the current crisis, the Asian Development Bank was already lending more than the World Bank 
inside the region, and the Inter-American Development Bank and FLAR were already providing more 
crisis-related financing in South America than the IMF [Woods, 2010]. The crisis accelerated this trend. 
The Asian, Inter-American and African Development Banks have responded to the crisis in their regions 
in some cases more quickly and with larger loans than we have seen from the IMF and the World Bank, 
and they have also introduced new types of temporary rapid financing programs and counter-cyclical 
lending facilities to support developing and low-income countries [Chin, 2010; Woods, 2010].  
 
The activism of the multilateral institutions was facilitated by the G-20’s decision in April 2009 to 
devolve a portion of the new financial commitments made to the IMF to regional (multilateral) 
institutions.16 Indonesia proposed in April 2009 that a portion of the IMF’s new financing be devolved 
to the Asian Development Bank. With G-20 backing, the Asian Development Bank introduced a new 
                                     
15 Details on membership, funding and voting rights at the Bank of the South from Phillips [2009] and the International Center for 
Trade and Sustainable Development [2009]. 
16 Details in this paragraph from Chin [2010], except where noted. 
  13countercyclical instrument, the Counter-cyclical Support Facility, to provide support of up to $3 billion 
to economies affected by the crisis in Asia. In total, the Asian Development Bank approved $8.8 billion 
in crisis support through a range of programs to countries in the region [ADB, 2009]. Regional 
development banks in other parts of the developing world quickly followed the Asian Development 
Bank’s example, and were granted a portion of the new funds committed to the IMF to establish new 
regional lending facilities to promote rapid counter-cyclical support within their regions. The African 
Development Bank established a $1.5 billion emergency liquidity facility, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank established a $6 billion program to support the countercyclical efforts of member 
governments. A privately financed entity, the Arab Monetary Fund, introduced a new short-term loan 
facility for crisis stricken countries. Five loans were made under this facility in 2009 for a total of $470M 
(up from $132M in 2008) [Arab Monetary Fund, 2009].  
 
Bilateral responses 
The current crisis has galvanized numerous bilateral mechanisms that provide diverse types of financial 
support to countries in distress outside the framework of the IMF. Indeed, Chin [2010] notes the 
enduring reliance on bilateral and national measures over regional arrangements for emergency financing.  
 
At the outset of the current crisis, Russia provided modest support to some regional neighbors 
[Henning, 2009]. The US Federal Reserve since December 2008 has opened temporary swap agreements 
with fourteen central banks (building on long-standing swap agreements with the Bank of Canada and 
the Bank of Mexico), including several in East Asia and Latin America. For example, Mexico now has a 
$30 billion currency swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve [Banco de México, 2009]. The EU 
contributed significant funds to the SBAs of many neighboring economies (e.g., Iceland, Hungary, 
Latvia).  
 
China has entered into numerous bilateral financial initiatives during the current crisis, though these are 
largely aimed not at lender of last resort functions, but rather to support the country’s trade relations 
during the economic downturn and to ensure access to strategic natural resources in the years to come. 
For example, during spring 2009, China doubled a development fund in Venezuela to $12 billion, lent 
Ecuador at least $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant (via a credit line with the China Development 
Bank), and lent Brazil’s national oil company $10 billion.17 Other Chinese deals have involved three-year 
currency swap arrangements that allow some of its trading partners to maintain reliable access to the 
Chinese currency (so that they can continue to pay for imports from the country in RMB rather than in 
US dollars), while ensuring that Chinese firms can pay for goods from trading partners in their 
currencies. For example, China has made arrangements to ensure that Argentina has access to $10 billion 
of RMB, and it has made the same kinds of arrangements with South Korea ($26.3 billion)18, Indonesia 
($14.6 billion), Belarus ($2.9 billion), Hong Kong ($29 billion) and Malaysia ($11.7 billion).19 Note that 
these bilateral swap arrangements do not challenge the role of the IMF (or the dollar for that matter) 
directly since the central banks of these countries cannot use the RMB to intervene in foreign exchange 
                                     
17 Details on these Chinese investments and currency swaps are drawn from Romero and Barrionuevo [4/16/09], Chin [2010]. On the 
credit line with Ecuador, see FLAR [2010]. 
18 South Korea also negotiated a two year $20 billion swap with Japan [Chin, 2010]. 
19 In July 2009, China also started to allow selected firms in five Chinese cities to use RMB to settle transactions with businesses in 
Hong Kong, Macau and ASEAN countries. Foreign banks will be allowed to buy or borrow Chinese currency from mainland lenders 
to finance such trade. During the crisis, Brazil and China also signed an agreement to settle trade using the RMB and the real.  
  14markets, import merchandise from third countries,20 or pay foreign banks or foreign bondholders 
because the currency remains inconvertible [Eichengreen, 2009b].  
 
Like China, Brazil and Argentina have moved to settle their trade transactions with one another in their 
own currencies (rather than using the US dollar as an intermediary). In October 2008 they signed a 
bilateral ‘Payments System on Local Currency”, which allows exporters and importers from both 
countries to settle their transactions in Brazilian real and Argentine pesos [Gnos and Ponsot, 2009]. 
Under this settlement mechanism, exporters can set prices in their home currency, and thus be insulated 
from foreign exchange risk. The system now covers 20% of trade [Tussie, 2010]  
 
Brazil’s National Bank of Economic and Social Development (Portuguese acronym, BNDES) eclipses all 
other national lending institutions in Latin America in terms of its assets—in 2007 its assets totaled 
$14.07 billion. This places the institution’s assets behind those of the region’s major multilateral bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, which had assets of $20.35 billion in 2007 [Chin, 2010]. BNDES 
has been extremely active during the crisis. Since the start of the crisis, BNDES has lent some $15 billion 
to countries in the region [Woods, 2010].  
 
BNDES has also moved both outside the country and outside the region. It has provided a growing 
amount of finance to countries in the Caribbean and Africa (as has China’s Development Bank) [Chin 
2010:697]. In August 2009, BNDES opened its first branch office in South America, in Montevideo, 
Uruguay [Chin 2010:710]. The World Bank has also partnered with BNDES to arrange new financing 
packages: the World Bank arranged for a $4 billion in new loans in Brazil, including a three-way loan for 
Brazil in partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank and BNDES (Chin 2010:710]. 
BNDES loans to developing countries from 2008 through the first quarter of 2010 reached $1.5 billion 
(though foreign aid from Brazil is channeled via other mechanisms as well), and BNDES’ rate of new 
lending now far exceeds that of the World Bank disbursements.21  
 
5. LOOKING AHEAD 
In light of all of these details it might be useful to recap here. We have seen that the global financial crisis 
has meant that the IMF has discovered new vitality as a first-responder to economic distress. Whether 
the IMF will use its renewed influence and financial resources in old ways (that is, in ways that constrain 
policy space in poorer countries and that reflect the interests and ideologies of its most powerful 
member nations) or in new ways (that expand the space for policy heterogeneity) will depend on many 
factors, not least of which is how and to what extent developing countries are able to use the financial 
crisis to continue to press for the expansion of their formal voting rights and their informal influence at 
the Fund. 
 
The newly resurrected institution faces a changed landscape. It no longer enjoys wall-to-wall influence 
across the developing world. The geography of IMF influence is, at present, significantly curtailed as a 
consequence of the rise of relatively autonomous states in the developing world and the emergence of 
                                     
20 The only exception is that the RMB can be used in cross-border trade with China’s immediate neighbors or the special 
administrative regions of Hong Kong or Macao. 
21 See Economist [July 15, 2010] on BNDES and Brazilian aid more generally, and Economist [August 5, 2010] for discussion of 
controversies regarding some of BNDES’s loans in connection with the country’s 2010 federal election. 
  15new financial architectures. Equally important, even within its orbit of influence its economists are 
responding to the current crisis in some ways that diverge from their recent past practice (as we have 
seen in the case of capital controls).  
 
We also see that policymakers are muddling through the crisis (Colander, 2003)—experimenting, among 
other things, with diverse types of institutional arrangements and ad hoc initiatives. From these strategies 
just might emerge a widely diverse platform of new arrangements that are tailored to the diverse contexts 
that policymakers face across the developing world. At this point, it remains unclear just how significant 
the architectural changes surveyed here will prove to be as competitors to the IMF.  
 
But what is clear is that the status quo ex ante no longer seems to be a possibility. It is becoming more 
apparent by the day that the financial architecture or architectures that emerge out of the crisis will be 
heterogeneous, multi-nodal and will provide for substantially greater policy space for developing 
countries than we have seen in recent decades. That said, barring any substantial change in the global 
political economy it will very much remain the case that only some developing countries will be so 
positioned so as to take advantage of this new autonomy. The most difficult policy challenge will be to 
address the most pressing needs of those states that lack the resources, geopolitical power and or 
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